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NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW
NOTES
Environmental Law-Preservation of the Estuarine Zone
What do people want? They can't save the whole shore. The salt
meadows don't do any good. Neither me nor anybody else wants to live
there. Its nothing but mud and mosquitos. The only real use for it is
marinas and that's the Jhighest value land use. That makes sense. More
and more people are buying boats, and they have to have a place to put
them. How many people do you see on the marsh now? A few bird
watchers maybe. If they want to bird watch on it, I don't care. I've got
better things to do than that, but I don't tell them what to do. Why are
they trying to tell me? Which do you prefer, birds or people?'
The starting point for any discussion of the problems of the
estuarine environment inevitably must be man's attitude toward the
estuaries and his understanding of their importance. The quotation
above illustrates the prevailing attitude toward the estuarine zone. Our
populace considers the estuary lands valuable only if they confer
material benefits, but in their natural state marsh and swampland confer
only aesthetic beauty and space for limited recreational pursuits. The
feeling is that since these values do not outweigh the benefits to be gained
by development, the highest and best uses can be achieved only by
dredging channels, filling in the marshes, and constructing houses,
industrial facilities, or marinas. Thus the prevailing attitude ignores the
immense ecological value of the estuarine environment and the benefits
conferred indirectly upon society by its continued existence. It is man's
failure to appreciate these benefits that poses the fundamental problem
for this discussion.
The legal definition of "estuary" is "that part of the mouth or
lower course of a river flowing into the sea which is subject to tide."'
However, a more satisfactory definition is "a semi-enclosed coastal
body of water having a free connection with the open sea and within
which the sea water is measureably diluted with fresh water deriving
from land drainage." 3 One cannot talk of the estuary alone but must
instead refer to the estuarine zone, which is an environmental system
'Hitchcock, The Day the Sea Ran Out of Flounder, NATURAL HISTORY, March, 1970, at 30.
2BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 652 (4th ed. 1951).
3R. Smith, Management of Estuarine Areas: A Background Paper for Considering Federal
Responsibilities, in ESTUARINE RESOURCES 13 (T. Jackson ed. 1969).
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influenced or affected by estuarine water, salt meadows and marshes,
bays, lagoons, sounds, intertidal areas, and areas of mixing between
water of the estuary and sea water of the ocean.
4
The tide-washed lands of the estuarine zone are the most fertile in
nature. "Acre for acre, salt marshes are equal in total production to the
highest value croplands, even when the latter is aided by all the science
and art of man. . . .The Niantic River estuary, for example, provides
about 300 pounds of scallops per acre per year, which is more than the
beef yield on good grazing land."' 5 One noted scholar, Eugene Odum,
concluded from research conducted in Georgia that estuarine marshes
produce almost ten tons of organic dry materials per acre per year. Such
productivity is almost twice that of the best farmland, seven times that of
the ocean along the continental shelf, and twenty times that of the ocean
beyond.6
However, food production is but a small part of the entire
ecological function of the estuaries. They also provide an integral link in
the marine life cycle. Phosphates, nitrates, and other minerals wash into
the estuarine waters from the land. The remains of marsh plants are
converted into organic food by bacteria. Tidal action flushes this
mixture from the marsh into the shallow waters where bait fishes,
worms, crustacea, shellfish, immature gamefish, and immature foodfish
feed on it.7 This continuing process is intimately related to the prosperity
of our commercial and sport fishing industries.
Another important function of the estuarine zone is protection of
young ocean fish that are too immature to survive in the open sea.
Larger predatory fishes are not found in the estuaries, primarily because
of the shallow depths and low salinity. Thus, immature fish can utilize
the shallows and weed beds as shelters during growth.
8
The marshlands of the estuarine zone also are used extensively by
migratory waterfowl for wintering, feeding, and breeding. The habitat
provides both nutrients and protection, without which these birds could
not exist. The disappearance of waterfowl would result in a decrease in
'Id.
'Hitchcock, supra note 1, at 78.
'C. Davis, reprinted from the Winston-Salem Journal & Sentinel, in ESTUARINE RESOURCES 37
(T. Jackson ed. 1969).
TClark, Why Salt Water Fishes Need the Shallow Coastal Estuaries, in PROCEEDINGS:
SYMPOSIUM ON ESTUARINE ECOLOGY, COASTAL WATERS OF NORTH CAROLINA 31 (1966).
Sld.
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revenues from hunting equipment sales and motel and restaurant
accommodations.
Other benefits conferred upon society by the estuarine environment
include flood control,9 silt filtration,' 0 recreational areas," and asthetic
beauty.
The primary problem, therefore, is one of educating the public
about the importance of the estuarine zone to the fulfillment of the more
direct needs of man. Every effort must be made to explain the necessity
of leaving the estuarine environment untouched. If this can be made a
matter of common understanding, the direct threats to the estuarine
environment will be reduced substantially.
Both natural and man-influenced degradations threaten the
estuarine environment. Natural degradations of the estuarine zone
constantly occur through the action of wind, tide, hurricanes, and other
natural .phenomena. Presently most natural forces which cause
degradafions are beyond our control, although technical advances may
someday enable us to dissipate hurricanes and storms producing gale
force winds. These forces are also a part of the natural systems of the
estuarine zone and assist in the processes of silt filtration, food
production, and land creation.
Due to our inability to control natural degradations, our major
effort must be directed at those degradations created by man in his
never-ending search for "progress." The two general categories of man-
influenced degradations are pollution and physical disruption.
'MARYLAND STATE PLANNING DEP'T, WETLANDS IN MARYLAND XIIi-I (1970). One acrc of
marshland is capable of absorbing and holding 300,000 gallons of water.
'*Hawkes, in a reprint from Transactions of the 31st North American Wildlife and Natural
Resources Conference, in ESTUARINE RESOURCES 20 (T. Jackson ed. 1969), says:
Removal of the marsh to increase the size of these small refuges [natural harbors] also
removes this scouring action and results in heavy siltation throughout the old natural
harbor and the new harbor created in place of the marsh. The result is a continuous
dredging problem in a much less valuable harbor in an area made far less productive of
things which made the entire coast attractive in the first place.
"d. at 19. Hawkes states:
Recreational value of the salt marsh itself is high when considered as a hunting, fishing,
shellfishing and birdwatching complex. The greatest contribution of the marsh to these
activities is, however, well beyond its immediate borders in the form of nutrients which
increase productivity and participant success in all of these pastimes throughout whole
regions. It is quite probable that the recreational values of both the fin and shell fisheries
in shallow coastal waters now equal or exceed their commercial value in the same areas.




The effects of the many types of pollutants have been heavily
documented in newspaper and magazine reports of environmental
catastrophes. The sources of these pollutants include municipal and
industrial wastes, pesticide and herbicide run-off from farmland,
thermal pollution from electrical utility generating plants, ship
collisions, and oil well leakage.
Oil pollution is a growing threat to the coastal areas, especially
since the size of vessels used to transport this important commodity is
constantly increasing. Commenting upon the effects of oil pollution,
Max Blumer, of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, said:
The immediate, short term effects of oil pollution are obvious and well
understood in kind, if not in extent. The oil pollution damage to coast
lines and to bird populations is well known. . . .Oil pollution on the
high seas is just being recognized, even though the amount of tar
already exceeds the amount of plant life floating at the sea's surface. In
contrast, we are rather ignorant about the long term and, low level
effects of crude pollution. I fear that these may well be far more serious
and longer lasting than the more obvious short term effects.'
2
In addition, Blumer noted that some of the principal causes of oil
pollution in harbor and coastal areas are faults in the design of ships and
storage units, mechanical failures, losses in transfers, accidents in
shipping, ballasting of bilges, the return to water of petroleum products
in untreated municipal wastes, and the incomplete combustion of marine
fuels .
3
Virtually all of these causes of pollution could be corrected to some
extent through modernization of equipment and technological advances
in design. And yet, as long as petroleum and oil are necessary for our
modern convenience, some pollution will continue to threaten our
estuarine zone. Legislation of the type recently enacted by Maine 4 and
Washington' 5 imposing strict liability for damage caused by oil
'Blumer, Oil Pollution of the Ocean, OCEANtJS, October, 1969, at 5.
'1d.
"Ch. 572, sub-ch. I1-A, [1970] Me. Spec. Sess. 35, amending ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, ch.
3 (1964). This legislation provides for absolute liability for oil pollution damage caused by the
transportation of oil and petroleum products. It creates the Maine Coastal Protection Fund,
financed by a tax of one-half cent per barrel of oil transported into the ports of the state, in order to
provide immediate financial resources for the rapid cleanup of oil spills.
"Ch. 88, [1970] Wash. Sess. L. 707. This legislation also imposes absolute liability for oil-
discharge damage on persons having control over the oil and gives the state the power to approve or
disapprove any proposed methods for dealing with oil-discharge catastrophes, thus avoiding the
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discharge appears to be a needed step toward countering the deleterious
effects of oil contamination.
Municipal and industrial waste disposal poses another threat to our
estuaries by causing eutrophication and by introducing an excessive
amount of nitrates and mercury into the estuarine system.
Eutrophication upsets the ecological balance of the estuaries by overly
stimulating the growth of acquatic vegetation. It occurs when waste
products which contain excessive phosphates are exposed to sunlight.,,
The introduction of excess nitrates into the estuarine system has a more
dangerous effect:
Small amounts of nitrate are naturally present in all bodies of water,
and living things can tolerate-and often require-nitrate at these low
levels. Now, however, nitrate originating in the outflow waters of
sewage treatment plants and in the runoff from land treated with
chemical fertilizers has begun to build up excessively in the ground
water in thirty eight regions of the United States. . . . An excess of
nitrate is poisonous to man and animals. 7
Similarly, poisonous heavy metals are collected in the tissues of living
organisms throughout the estuarine food chain. The higher orders of
marine life accumulate greater amounts of poisonous metals in their
tissues because the tissues of the lower orders which they ingest already
contain concentrations of the metals. The ultimate effect may be the
poisoning of man.
Numerous rivers have been closed to fishing because of dangerous
levels of mercury discovered in the tissue of fish and shellfish. Municipal
and industrial waste discharges from Wilmington, North Carolina, and
other communities on the Cape Fear River have resulted in severe
pollution of the estuaries near Smith Island (Bald Head Island). In the
early 1960's, a serious epidemic of viral hepatatis broke out at Camp
Lejeune, North Carolina, and the surrounding civilian towns as a result
of pollution of the New River and the infection of the oysters harvested
there. The source of pollution was determined to be untreated waste
from the Marine Corps Base at Camp Lejeune.15 Fishing and shellfishing
secondary effects of detergents and other chemicals that have been used to disperse oil slicks in the
past and which have added in turn to the environmental toll.
"Wallace, reprinted from WILDLIFE IN NORTH CAROLINA, in ESTUARINE RESOURCEs 62 (T.
Jackson ed. 1969).
I1d. at 59-62.
"1B. COMMONER, SCIENCE AND SURVIVAL 12 (1966).
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in both the lower Cape Fear River and the New River are now
prohibited. 9 There is a danger of eutrophication in the Pamlico Sound
area of North Carolina due to the location of a Texas Gulf Sulphur
Company plant which has introduced excessive phosphates into the
waters there."0 When we consider the municipal sewage and industrial
waste problem and its effects upon the estuaries, we must remember that
estuaries are the recipients of waste loadings from the upland non-tidal
areas representing the upland development of these river systems. In
addition, the communities that straddle the estuaries themselves place
upon these estuaries the burden of municipal and industrial waste
pollution
a.2
Legislation to eliminate the threat of municipal and industrial waste
discharges cannot focus entirely on the coastal region and ignore the
waste dissemination of inland communities. One recent legislative
innovation developed to deter pollution on a state-wide level is the water
pollution fee. Vermont has established stringent water-quality standards
for all of its waters, and charges polluters a fee determined in accordance
with a system of effluent charges. The amount of the fee is determined by
considering the nature and amount of the effluent discharged, the
frequency of discharges, and the effect the discharges have upon the
water-quality standards established.2 The purpose of the legislation is to
prod municipalities and industries into taking immediate action to lower
the output of deleterious wastes by making continued pollution costly.
There is some debate about the effects of thermal pollution upon
estuarine waters. Warm currents tend to stimulate the growth of
nutrients and thus to increase the supply of nutrients available to fish
and shellfish; however, excessive and prolonged warmth also may speed
eutrophication and thereby prove harmful to the marine life of the
estuaries. 23 Recently Washington enacted legislation vesting a state
agency with the power to approve or disapprove the location of thermal
power plant sites. The agency's decision is based on comprehensive
ecological studies conducted by independent, neutral contractors.
24
I'D. CARR, DEATH OF SWEET WATERS 50 (1966).
"REGULATIONS, N.C. BOARD OF CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT.
I'DeFalco, The Estuary-Septic Tank of the Megalopolis, in ESTUARIES 22 (G. Lauff ed.
1968).
i0 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 901-920 (Supp. 1971).
'See generally Edwards, Legal Control of Thermal Pollution, 2 NATURAL RESOURCE LAW. 1
(1969).
2VCh. 45, [1970] Wash. Sess. L. 313.
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The numerous other pollutants in the estuarine habitat include
detergents,25 pesticides, herbicides,'2 and solid waste. It must be
remembered that all of these pollutants have the capacity to effect
chanies in the ecology of the estuary, both by direct poisoning of certain
marine food sources and by upsetting the natural balances of the food
chains. Ultimately any such changes will affect the capability of the
estuarine zone to provide benefits to man.
The other man-influenced degradations of the estuarine
environment are the physical alterations of the habitat. Channelization
activities, dredge-and-fill projects, impoundment of waters, and
commercial development are characteristic examples. Invariably, these
actions occur as a result of the quest for economic profit. Because
estuarine land is inexpensive in comparison to other land, there is an
economic incentive to fill in and build upon the seemingly unproductive
marsh..The dredge-and-fill process disrupts the entire ecology of the
marsh "and its surrounding estuarine waters. Sedimentation caused by
the project kills shellfish by suffocation and forces finfish to seek new
protective areas. The marsh becomes solid land, and loses its value for
food production, fish protection, flood control, and silt filtration.
Only two states in the nation-Alaska and Louisiana-have more
estuarine-habitat area than North Carolina's 2,200,000 acres. 2
In 1952 the State of North Carolina made an inventory of estuarine
wetlands. In 1967 biologists of the Wildlife Resources Commission
took that 1952 study-one that covered 13 coastal counties-and used
it as a reference point to determine what had occurred in the intervening
15 years. The biologists concluded that in that brief period man had
either substantially altered or destroyed 28.5 per cent-some 45,292
acres-of the state's remaining salt water marshlands.2
The study made it obvious that legal controls were necessary, and in
1967 the General Assembly enacted a "dredge registration law,' '29 which
required registration of all power-driven earth-moving equipment used in
the estuarine zone. In 1969, the General Assembly moved further to
control the destruction of North Carolina estuaries by enacting
2B. COMMONER, supra note 18, at 19-2 !.
26See generally R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
"Rice, Estuarine Lands of North Carolina: Legal Aspects of Ownership, Use and Control, 46
N.C.L. REv. 779 (1968).
2'Davis, supra note 6, at 36.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6.1 (Supp. 1969).
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legislation vesting the Department of Conservation and Development
with the power to approve or disapprove any proposed alteration of the
estuarine zone.3 ° Many other states have enacted similar measures.3 1
Another source of destruction of the estuarine zone is an outgrowth
of man's desire to eradicate the mosquito, which breads extensively in
the shallow pools of the salt marshes. To eliminate these pools, state
authorities wisely have not used persistent pesticides such as DDT. As an
alternative, however, they have embarked on an extensive channelization
project designed to drain the marshes and eliminate the stagnant pools
essential to the breeding of the salt-marsh mosquito. Such
channelization has disrupted the ecology of the estuarine zone to an
unknown degree."
Extensive channelization activities have also been carried out by the
Corps of Engineers, which has jurisdiction over navigable waters of the
estuarine zone. It is believed that the effects of these channelization
projects on the ecology of the estuaries have been extremely harmful. A
study to determine the extent of the environmental damage was
conducted by student interns working with the Wildlife Resources
Commission during the summer of 1970. Preliminary reports stressed
concern over the rapid decrease in the water table in areas which had
been channelized.3
Beach-erosion projects and hurricane-protection activities of the
Department of Water and Air Resources in North Carolina may also
affect the estuarine ecology. Groins and other artificial structures placed
along coastal beaches trap sand on the upward side and thus build up the
beach in one area. However, tidal action increases on the downward side
and often accelerates erosion. One writer has commented:
If man wishes to build his works on the fringes of such a battleground,
he must understand that the rules of this ancient battle require the
30N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-229 (Supp. 1969).
"E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-7h to -7o (Supp. 1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch.
131, § 40A (Supp. 1971).
"Staton, Salt Marsh Mosquito Control Programs, in PROCEEDINGS: SYMPOSIUM ON
ESTUARINE ECOLOGY, COASTAL WATERS OF NORTH CAROLINA 19-21 (1966).
"This study, made by William Tarplee, Jr. and Larry Chapman under the supervision of
biologist Dr. Darryl Louder of the Wildlife Resources Commission, was the result of an
Environmental Intern Program initiated by Governor Robert Scott of North Carolina. Preliminary
reports of this study state that "if something is not done to stop channelization in'North Carolina,
there will be no natural swamps left .,. . ." See Tarplee, Effects of Channelization Projects on
Stream Habitats, in REPORTS OF NORTH CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL INTERNS 52-59 (1970).
1Id. at 54-59.
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beach, the berm, and the dunes to shift constantly before the assault of
the sea. If man tries to change these rules, he can only fail; and in his
failure he may even undermine the fragile hold of these outposts against
the powerful sea. 5
The extensive use of artificial structures to assist nature in the building of
barrier beaches and to protect houses endangered by the shifting sands of
the beaches may bring temporary results; but as a result of these
activities, the tidal currents are shifted and often have an even more
errosive effect upon another section of the beach. Consequent
breakthroughs in the barrier beaches cause salt water to intrude into the
estuaries. This sudden introduction of saline water upsets the balance of
the estuarine ecosystem and kills that marine life which depends upon
less saline water.
Many of the problems confronted by the estuarine zone could be
dissipated if the area could be brought under state or federal control and
thus subjected to knowledgeable planning activities. However, in most
states ownership of the estuarine zone is unclear. Private ownership is
claimed, and the land is subject to the plans of individuals." Land
acquisition costs are high and prohibit large-scale condemnation by the
states. The enormity of the problem of acquisition is illustrated by the
negotiations surrounding North Carolina's attempt to purchase the Bald
Head Island salt-marsh complex from private developers: North
Carolina would be required to make a capital outlay of as much as
5,500,000 dollars to acquire approximately 3,000 acres of land in a
condemnation proceeding.37
This discussion has concentrated upon the major problems
confronting the estuarine zone. Clearly, the direct problems of pollution
and physical disruption stem from man's ignorance of the immense
value of the estuarine habitat. Primary emphasis should be placed upon
educating the public as to this value. Ecology programs which explain
the benefits of the estuarine zone and how the estuary is endangered by
man must be instituted throughout the school systems of the state. The
state should take such steps as are feasible to acquire estuarine land. This
Schuberth, Barrier Beaches of Eastern America, NATURAL HISTORY, June-July, 1970, at 47.
"Rice, supra note 27.
'The 3,000 acres of land in question here consists only of the high ground of the Bald Head
Island complex, which the State of North Carolina acknowledges as being vested in the developers.
The remaining 9,000 4cres consists of salt marsh to which the state claims title and upon which the
developers do not contemplate construction.
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will require ascertainment of those lands not owned by the state and
studies to determine priorities of acquisition. New legislation must be
developed and all environmental-protection legislation must be
efficiently enforced by the appropriate state agencies. Every effort must
be made to increase the efficiency of municipal and industrial facilities.
Heavy penalties similar to those imposed by the Vermont legislature s
may be necessary to prevent private citizens from polluting. Above all,
there is a need for total environmental planning in the uses to be
permitted of our estuarine zone. We must endeavor to determine realistic
long-term uses that are not destructive to the estuarine environment and
to limit development to those non-degradatory uses."
KENNETH W. PARSONS
Environmental Law-The Public Trust Doctrine: A Useful Tool in the
Preservation of Sand Dunes
The problem of preventing the destruction of sand dunes by private
interests should be of grave concern to North Carolina citizens. Indeed,
the problem has been recognized by a specific statutory finding that the
North Carolina coast "is wholly or in part protected from actions of the
Atlantic Ocean and storms thereon by a system of natural or
constructed dunes."' Our present statutes provide that
it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation in any manner
to damage, destroy, or remove any sand dune, or part thereof, lying
along the outer banks of this State . . . or to kill, destroy, or remove
any trees, shrubbery, grass, or other vegetation growing on sand dunes,
without first having obtained a permit as specified herein authorizing
such proposed damage, destruction, or removal.
2
Violation of this statute is a misdemeanor resulting upon conviction in
the imposition of a fine of not less than fifty dollars and not more than
500 dollars.
3
-See note 22 supra.
"North Carolina has laid the basis for such planning. See COASTAL ZONE RESOURCES
CORPORATION, A PRELIMINARY PLAN FOR THE NORTH CAROLINA ESTUARY STUDY (rev. 1970).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 104B-3 (Supp. 1969).
2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 104B-4 (Supp. 1969).
3N.C. GEN. STAT. § 104B-12 (Supp. 1969).
'See Morgan, On the Legal Aspects of North Carolina Coastal Problems, 49 N.C.L. REv.
857, 864 (1971).
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Unfortunately, an administrative approach has not resolved the
problem that many coastal property owners now face.4 Consider the
following example: X Corporation buys fifty acres of land fronting on
the Atlantic Ocean and proceeds to build a large beach-front motel. To
enhance the view for the motel guests and make access to the ocean
easier, the corporation begins removing the sand dunes along its
property. If X Corporation is able to obtain the requisite permit from
the county board of commissioners, can the neighboring property
owners bring an action in a North Carolina state court to prevent the
removal of the dunes, and, if so, on what theory? The purpose of this
note is to suggest that in appropriate cases the attorney general should
intervene on behalf of neighboring property owners even after authority
for removal has been granted by the county board, and that the "public
trust" doctrine can be used to justify that intervention. In fact, resort to
the doctrine is required to protect the public interest from the short-
sighted administrative decisions that high-pressure tactics yield. One
commentator has noted that
public officials are frequently subjected to intensive representations on
behalf of interests seeking official concessions to support proposed
enterprises. The concessions desired by those interests are often of
limited visibility to the general public so that public sentiment is not
aroused; but the importance of the grants to those who seek them may
lead to extraordinarily vigorous and persistent .efforts. It is in these
situations thdt public trust lands are likely to 6e put in jeopardy and
that legislative watchfulness is likely to be at the lowest levels. 5
One of the early landmark cases in the development of the public
trust doctrine was Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,6 which
involved a statute enacted by the Illinois state legislature to revoke a
prior grant of nearly the entire Chicago water front to the Illinois
Central Railroad. In upholding the revocation, the Court noted that
[tihe harbor of Chicago is of immense value to the people of the State
of Illinois in the facilities it affords to its vast and constantly increasing
commerce; and the idea that its legislature can deprive the State of
control over its bed and waters and place the same in the hands of a
private corporation created for a different purpose, one limited to
'Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,
68 MICH. L. REV. 471,495 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sax].
'146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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transportation of passengers and freight between distant points and the
city, is a proposition that cannot be defended. 7
This early public trust case falls far short of justifying the North
Carolina Attorney General in seeking an injunction to prevent removal
of sand dunes by a private corporation on private property. However,
North Carolina does have some case history which could be used as a
basis for development of the public trust doctrine. In 1903, the North
Carolina Supreme Court decided Shepard's Point Land Co. v. Atlantic
Hotel.8 Therein the court recited. with favor the following declaration
from Illinois Central Railroad Co.:
The State can no more abdicate its trusts over property in which the
whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them,
so as to leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties
• . . than it can abdicate its police power in the administration of
government and the preservation of peace. So with trusts connected
with public property orproperty of a special character, like lands under
navigable waters, they cannot be placed entirely beyond the direction
and control of the State?
Shepard's Point Land Co. clearly provides a foundation for the use of
the public trust doctrine in North Carolina. Other states, including
Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and California, have developed and refined
the use of this doctrine. For example, the Massachusetts courts have
avoided direct confrontation with the legislature, but have in many
instances been successful in protecting public lands. Professor Sax says
of the Massachusetts approach: "The court has served notice to all
concerned that it will view with skepticism any dispositions of trust lands
and will not allow them unless it is perfectly clear that the dispositions
have been fully considered by the legislature."'" In Gould v. Greylock
Reservation Commission," the Massachusetts Supreme Court prevented
a state agency from permitting a publicly preserved natural forest to be
turned into a ski resort, remarking that it found "no express grant to the
Authority of power to permit use of public lands. . . for what seems, in
part at least, a commercial venture for private profit."'
2
71d. at 454.
8132 N.C. 517,44 S.E. 39 (1903).
11d. at 527-28, 44 S.E. at 42 (emphasis added).
"Sax 502.
"350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
1"Id. at 426, 215 N.E.2d at 126.
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According to Professor Sax, "[t]he Supreme Court of Wisconsin
has probably made a more conscientious effort to rise above rhetoric
and to work out a reasonable meaning for the public trust doctrine than
have the courts of any other state."13 In Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land
& Improvement Co.'4 the Wisconsin Supreme Court said:
[I]f the state had power. . . to convey and relinquish. . . all its right,
title, and interest in and to all lands lying within the limits of Muskego
Lake, then it may, in a similar manner, convey and relinquish to
private persons or corporations all such right, title, and interest in and
to every one of the 1,240 lakes in Wisconsin."9
City of Milwaukee v. State6 affords a clear description of the trust
aspect of the public trust doctrine:
The trust reposed in the State is not a passive trust; it is
governmental, active, and administrative. . . . The equitable title to
these submerged lands vests in the public at large, while the legal title
vests in the State. .... 17
Professor Sax cites several California cases which show the
reluctance of California courts to overrule express legislative
enactments. However, he does cite one interesting section from the
California Government Code:" "The Legislature hereby finds and
declares that the public interest in the San Francisco Bay is in its
beneficial use for a variety of purposes; that the public has an interest in
the bay as the most valuable single natural resource of an entire
region .. "20
Thus, other states do not hestitate to use the public trust doctrine to
protect certain types of land after administrative safeguards have failed.
In most of the public trust cases, the land involved has been state-owned
land which had been either sold to or put under control of private
interests. With respect to the protection of sand dunes, the public trust
doctrine is clearly relevant when the dunes are located on publicly owned
beaches. However, in many instances the dunes are located on property
'3Sax 509.
193 Wis. 534,67 N.W. 918 (1896).
'11d. at 551, 67 N.W. at 922.
"1193 Wis. 423, 214 N.W. 820 (1927).
'71d. at 449, 214 N.W. at 830.
SSee Sax 524-38.
"Id. at 532 & n. 185.
2CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 66600 (West 1966).
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that has been in private hands for many years. Can the public trust
doctrine be used to prevent removal of dunes that are on private
property? Both Illinois Centr4l Railroad Co. and Shepard's Point Land
Co. speak of property of a "special character" which cannot be placed
entirely beyond the direction and control of the state. Recently, in
Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach,2 the
North Carolina Supreme Court emphasized the peculiarly public nature
of lands on which sand .dunes are located. The court declared:
"Manifestly, the purpose [of building the sand wall] was the
preservation and protection of the Town of Carolina Beach from the
fury of the sea rather than the reclamation of the lands of private owners
along the beach." 2 Sand dunes are one of the few natural protections
from high wind and water damage. Surely the "special character" of the
small strips of land on which sand dunes are located justifies state
control of them.
According to Professor Sax, there is a "rule of water law that one
does not own a property right in water in the same way he owns his
watch or his shoes, but that he owns only an usufruct-an interest that
incorporates the needs of others.' 23 This same concept should be
extended to include those who own property that contains sand dunes. A
further insight into the nature of lands that have a "special public
character" is revealed in Yates v. Milwaukee,24 which was quoted with
approval by the North Carolina court in Shepard's Point Land Co.2 In
Yates, the United States Supreme Court said: "This riparian right is
property, and is valuable, and, though it must be enjoyed in due
subjection to the rights of the public, it cannot be arbitrarily or
capriciously destroyed1 or impaired. ' 26 The same rule should apply to
those who own littoral rights in coastal property.
It is and always has been difficult to get a "sympathetic ear" when
private property rights are affected. However, notwithstanding the
resistance of private owners, the attorney general should be armed with
legal tools to protect the public interests. The concept of the public trust
doctrine -can be utilized as a vital back-up to established administrative
21277 N.C. 297, 177 S.E.2d 513 (1970).
2Id. at 304, 177 S.E.2d at 517.
2Sax 485.
2477 U.S. (10 Wa1l.)497 (1870).
2*132 N.C. at 379, 44 S.E. at 45.
277 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 504 (emphasis added).
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safeguards. In order to counteract the pressure brought to bear upon
administrative agencies by private groups to secure permits to remove
dunes, in appropriate situations the North Carolina Attorney General's
Department should use the public trust doctrine to protect coastline
property. Although the guidelines should be spelled out in specific terms
by our legislature, the attorney general should not hesitate to invoke the
doctrine as enunciated in the case law.
FRANK B. JACKSON
Environmental Law-Water Resources-Zones of Shared Conservation
Authority and United States Public Policy
The exercise of conservation authority must be understood in the
context of the conservation movement as a living and evolving ethic in
the American conscience. Many writers trace the emergence of the
conservation movement as a real force in the United States to the
Governor's Conference of 1908 called by President Roosevelt and the
subsequent work of the National Conservation Commission.'
In the beginning, this movement generated a great unity of purpose
and direction. The Commission's scientists focused the laws of man on
the laws of nature. The Commission itself contributed the concept of
resource management to the movement by publishing an inventory of the
nation's resources. Yet as the movement grew it began to fragment, for
one of its essential characteristics was the propensity to attract
exceptionally diverse groups. Those who placed nature's highest values
in the aesthetics marched to the cause alongside the sportsmen, the
lumbermen, the developers, and other groups who understood nature's
utility value. While each group could agree on the general concept of
conservation, their specific interests conflicted.
William Howard Taft, who followed Roosevelt into office, once
remarked that conservation was such an abstruse subject that many
people were for it no matter what it meant.2 His remark captured the
essential weakness of the movement. In the eyes of the political scientist,
the form of the classic political struggle-which is the basic ingredient of
the democratic process-surfaced in the conflict of the group interests:
'See, e.g., N. WENGERT, NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE 22 (1955).
2
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, PERSPECTIVES ON CONSERVATION 8 (1951).
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"Like the warp and woof of a fine tapestry, decisions in this field are
made up of many elements and influences, crisscrossing and interacting,
yet not without pattern and design."13 The purpose of this note is to
examine the expression of that pattern in the nation's water resource law
within the framework of shared authority demanded by the federal
system.
FEDERAL AUTHORITY
Federal authority over the nation's waterways is not based on an
express constitutional grant of power. By judicial construction and
legislation, federal authority over the nation's maritime law was forged
from federal jurisdiction over commerce and navigation. In Gibbons v.
Ogden the Supreme Court stated that commerce "comprehends
navigation." ' 4 The Court faced the issue squarely in Gilman v.
Philadelphia, where it stated that "[c]ommerce includes navigation"
and that for that purpose all the nation's navigable waters "are the
public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation
by Congress."
'5
At the same time, however, the courts recognized that the states had
a proprietary interest in the rivers and riverbeds, subject to the
acknowledged federal jurisdiction. The technical title to the beds of the
navigable rivers of the United States remained either in the states in
which they were situated or in the riparian owners of their banks,
depending on state law. 6
Perhaps Martin v. Lessee of Waddell' provides the most explicit
statement of the interrelation of state and federal power over the nation's
rivers. There the Court declared that "when the Revolution took place,
the people of each state became themselves sovereign; and in that
character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the
soils under them for their own common use, subject only to the rights
since surrendered by the Constitution to the general government."
8
From that paramount qualification developed the general rule that the
3N. WENGERT, supra note 1, at 3.
'22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
570 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724-25 (1865).
6See, e.g., United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 60 (1913).
'41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
81d. at 410.
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United States held a superior easement in the flow of the nation's rivers
based on its powers over commerce and navigation.9
After substantial judicial expansion of the commerce clause
throughout the nineteenth century, Congress boldly enacted the Rivers
and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899.1" Section ten of that Act
prohibits the creation of obstructions in any of the waters of the United
States." Section thirteen forbids the discharge of any refuse other than
local sewage unless such discharge is pursuant to a permit granted by the
Corps of Engineers. 2 The strength of these prohibitions reflects the deep
concern of Americans over the "threat of pollution at the turn of the
century. It is paradoxical, however, that despite the apparent concern the
real potential of this legislation would lie dormant for nearly seventy
years.
ZONES OF SHARED AUTHORITY
Large areas of responsibility were left open to the states as the
outline of a federal system of control over the nation's waterways began
to emerge. Generally, the states exercised their inherent police power
over the use, distribution, and conservation of water resources within
their borders. Yet the flow of the nation's river systems did not always
respect state boundaries, and infrastuructures evolved within the federal
framework as compacts or agreements were signed by the states. From
the first, Congress liberally granted its constitutionally required 3
consent to such compacts, and then by a statute enacted in 1948
Congress gave blanket consent to any such compact entered into for the
purpose of conservation or pollution abatement." Compacts were a
possible vehicle for bringing interstate action to the river basin.
However, development of the nation's water resources was soon
dominated by a new concept of conservation. American technology was
capable of producing the giant hydroelectric dam. Many conservation
groups could identify their interests with the multi-purpose dam and its
ability to provide flood control, irrigation, electric power, pollution
'3 PRESIDENT'S WATER RESOURCES POLICY COMM'N, vATER RESOURCES LAW 25 (1950).
"oAct of March 3, 1899, ch. 425, §§ 1-22, 30 Stat. 1121 (codified in scattered sections of 33
U.S.C.).
"33 U.S.C. § 403 (1964).
"233 U.S.C. § 407 (1964).
"U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
1433 U.S.C.A. § 1154(c) (1970),formerly 33 U.S.C. § 466(b) (1964).
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control, and wildlife protection. Conflicting group interests reached a
consensus in the theory of multiple use, which acknowledged the twin
goals of conservation and economic development of nature's resources.
The multiple-use doctrine was written into the Federal Power-Act of
1920.15
The passage of the Federal Power Act foreshadowed federal
dominance over river-basin development, and Congress marshalled most
of its delegated power to take control. In 1950 the President's Water
Resource Policy Commission Report referred to the use of the
commerce power, the proprietary power, the war power, the treaty
power, and the general welfare power by Congress." Strong economic
forces also shaped resource policy at the federal level. Huge multi-
purpose projects provided desperately needed work for those individuals
displaced by the economic disasters of the 1930's.
Federal dominance over the river basin began to emerge when the
Supreme Court announced that all "navigable waters [were] subject to
national planning and control in the broad regulation of commerce
granted the Federal Government." 7 One year later the Court recognized
that it was "for Congress alone to decide whether a particular project,
by itself or as part of a more comprehensive scheme, [would] have such a
beneficial effect on the arteries of interstate commerce as to warrant
it."'" In the same case the Court rejected the proposition that a federal
multi-purpose project could be halted when that project interfered with
the state's own program for water development and conservation., 9 By
1957 the following comparison of federal and state controls was made:
The federal government now dominates in the fields of navigation,
flood control, hydroelectric power development, irrigation and river
basin planning. The states dominate in the fields of water rights, urban
water supplies, drainage, and fish and wildlife management. The
responsibilities are more shared in the fields of power regulation,
recreational planning, pollution control, and small watershed
development.20
The multi-use doctrine had greatly altered the federal scheme.
1516 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1964).
"13 PRESIDENT'S WATER RESOURCES POLICY COMM'N, WATER RESOURCES LAW 5-70 (1950).
"United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426-27 (1940).
"Oklahoma exrel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508,527 (1941).
"Id. at 534-35.
2"Englebert, Federalism and Water Resources, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 325, 330 (1957).
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NEW Focus ON SHARED AUTHORITY
The 1960's brought the conservation movement full circle. The
science of ecology exposed the public to the concept that man exists in a
closed ecosystem. The ethic acquired a new dimension in the knowledge
that all life on earth is interdependent and that nature's delicate balance
is severely threatened by pollution. Congress responded to protect what
it saw as the public interest and passed several major amendments to the
1948 Water Pollution Control Act.21 Each amendment preserved the
original policy of the 1948 Act, which left primary responsibility for
pollution control in the states, but each addition staked out a new federal
framework in the structure. By 1970 a clumsy system of pollution
control had evolved, generated by the establishment of federal water-
quality standards and enforced by a conference procedure, a hearing
procedure, and court actions in abatement.
The threat of environmental degradation has placed a new burden
on the institutional patterns of shared authority. The establishment of a
conservation policy of pollution control must be accomplished within a
new matrix of authority. First, water pollution is a local concern in the
sense that it must be abated at the source. Local governments exercise
the kinds of authority which must be used in pollution abatement: the
power to zone and to grant the certification for certain uses of the water
resource. In addition, water pollution in the river basin generates
regional conflicts, as when, for example, a city in one state pollutes much
of the downstream river basin in another state. Finally, institutions
under public control-such as public utility installations regulated by
state governments, local sewage systems, and large naval bases operated
by the federal government-have been identified as major contributors
to water pollution.22
Public demands on these institutions can be expected to produce
adjustments within the federal structure with regard to the exercise of
resource policy. A trend in the exercise of federal authority surfaced
recently in a report submitted to Congress by the House Standing
Committee on Governmental Operations.2 The Committee severely
criticized the Federal Water Pollution Control Act on the following
grounds: (I) federal water-quality standards apply only to waters that
. 1See 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151-75 (1970).
nH.R. REP. No. 1433,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1970).
=H.R. REP. No. 91-917, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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flow interstate; (2) abatement proceedings must be postponed until 180
days after notice of the violation of the Act is served; and, (3) abatement
proceedings under the Act can be instituted only with the consent of the
governor of the polluting state. The Committee compared the scope of
the enforcement powers of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act with
those of the older Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899 and
discovered that the 1899 Act has none of the limitations imposed on the
more recent legislation, which provides that it shall not be construed to
affect or impair the prohibitions of the 1899 Act.24 Thus seventy years
after its passage, Congress rediscovered the potential of one of the
nation's earliest pollution controls.
In bold-face black type the Committee admonished the Corps of
Engineers to enforce vigorously the 1899 Act. Several methods of
enforcement are available under the Act. The Corps may seek an
injunction in the federal courts or request that a polluter remove a
discharge voluntarily 5 Or, according to a recent Supreme Court case,
the government can do the work itself and then bill the polluter for the
cost if the polluter's conduct was wilful or negligent. 21 Finally, the Corps
may seek a criminal sanction under the Act. Recently, in Zabel- v.
Tabb,2 1 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit cited, quoted, and
relied on the Committee report and stated that it "stifles any doubt as to
how this part of Congress construes the Corps' duty under the Rivers
and Harbors Act [of 1899].''2s
The most novel aspect of the Committee report was its suggestion
that the ancient qui tam action be used to implement the criminal
sanctions of section sixteen of the 1899 Act. Section sixteen imposes a
fine of not more than 2,500 dollars and provides that "one-half of said
fine [shall] be paid to person or persons giving information which shall
lead to conviction. ' 2 The qui tam action arises where a statute such as
the 1899 Act provides that part of the fine shall be paid to citizens who
furnish sufficient information concerning a violation to convict the
violator and the government fails to prosecute within a reasonable period
of time. The informer can then sue the violator in the name of the
2133 U.S.C.A. § 1174 (1970).
"United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
"Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
-430 F.2d 199 (1970).
28d. at 214.
-33 U.S.C. § 411 (1964).
1971]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
government to collect his portion of the fine." Because of this possibility,
the 1899 Act appears to be a potent weapon in the federal arsenal.
CONCLUSION
The gradual evolution of the conservation ethic has produced a
substantial change in the nation's resource policy. The idea that there is
a public responsibility-even a public trust-involved in man's relation
to his natural environment has distinctly emerged. Pressures are building
on both the public and private sectors to carry out their fiduciary duty.
However, decision makers at every level of public activity are faced
with a dilemma. The sheer magnitude of environmental degradation
demands a unity of action, and yet the authority to deal with the
problem resides at all levels of government. The weakness of the current
pollution-control legislation was recently described in the President's
proposals for improving the environment, which were submitted to
Congress on February 8, 1971. 31 Radical new innovations, such as the
elimination of the cumbersome enforcement conference and the hearing
procedure of the present law, were included in the presidential proposals.
Also, there was a proposal requesting Puthorization for private legal
actions against violators of water-quality standards in order to bolster
state and federal enforcement efforts.
Notwithstanding the innovation represented by the President's
proposals, the basic fault of the Water Pollution Control Act was not
recognized: Pollution of the river basin remains basically a regional
problem, but there was no proposal to shift the present state-centered
authority over pollution control to regional authorities. Because the river
basins have no respect for state boundaries, and in the absence of
adequate federal legislation, successful pollution abatement in the future
will depend upon the ability of the states to coordinate the sharing of
intrastate as well as interstate zones of authority over the river basin.
MICHAEL R. SCHOENENBERGER
1On August 13, 1970, the Governmental Operations Committee report was supplemented by a
carefully researched report by its subcommittee on the qui tam action. Organized as an outline for
citizen action under the 1899 Act, the latter report reviews the history of the action and cites the
constitutional authority for it. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 91ST
CONG., 2D SEss., Qui TAM AcTiONS AND THE 1899 REFUSE ACT: CITIZEN LAWSUITS AGAINST
POLLUTERS OF THE NATION'S WATERWAYS (Comm. Print 1970).
31U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Feb. 22, 1971, at 73.
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International Law-Disposal of Radioactive Wastes in the Oceans
In 1970 Thor Heyerdahl, the well-known explorer and ethnologist,
made an experimental voyage over the sea in a papyrus boat. He
reported frequent encounters with floating wastes in mid-ocean and
noted that the waters in many areas were visibly polluted.' As a result
pollution of the high seas, as opposed to coastal waters and continental
shelf areas, received some of the public attention that had been focused
largely on urban airspace, inland rivers, and coastal shorelines. If
thought of in terms of pollution at all, the fathomless depths of the
oceans and their vast surface expanses--covering some seventy per cent
of the earth-had generally been considered both as a possible
alternative site for waste disposal and as somehow immune to the
noxious effects such activity had worked on more visible areas.
Many sources of pollution by dumping in the high seas have been
identified. Included among them are dredge spoils, sewage sludge, solid
waste or garbage, industrial waste, unserviceable munitions, and
construction or demolition debris. 2 While all of these are significant in
terms of amount and in varying degrees are harmful or toxic to marine
life, hazardous to human health, and aesthetically unattractive, this note
will focus on the disposal of radioactive waste, an even more dangerous
cause of ocean pollution.
3
Although in 1960 the United States Atomic Energy Commission
placed a moratorium on the issuance of new licenses for disposal of
radioactive wastes in the ocean, 4 the increasing world-wide potential use
of nuclear energy for land-based power plants, submarines, surface
vessels, airplanes, and space vehicles necessitates continued
consideration of the problem of radioactive disposals at sea. Moreover,
with the number of countries involved in nuclear activity growing
rapidly, it is clear that the action of more than one nation is required
if effective eradication of the pollution danger from ocean disposal of
radioactive waste is to be achieved. Concerned public and scientific
'New York Times, May 10, 1970, § I, at 8, col. I.
ZCOUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, OCEAN DUMPING-A NATIONAL POLICY: A REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT iv (1970) [hereinafter cited as OCEAN DUMPING].
3Radioactive wastes may be defined as "the liquid and solid wastes that result from processing
of irradicated fuel elements, nuclear reactor operations, medical use of radioactive isotopes, and
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groups throughout the world have proposed that their governments
undertake a variety of multilateral treaties or individual initiatives. The
effect of these recommendations, however, is to suggest that the ocean
dumping of wastes at present would not violate customary international
law.5 A consideration of that question is the major purpose of this note.
It has been maintained that the overriding policy which has inspired
the customary regime of the high seas has been "the promotion of the
most advantageous-that is, the most conserving and fully
utilizing-peaceful use and development by all peoples of a great
-common resource .... "6 The elements of commonality and
reciprocity seem to have been most important in this development, and
it apparently was upon these foundation stones that the doctrine of
freedom of the seas was built. Freedom of the seas is generally
understood to be "a freedom of access, such that no single user can
exclude others from participating directly and simultaneously in the
same use."' 7 Expressed another way, the law of the sea "is based on
the concept of common property . . . . , The principal legal
justification which might be given by a nation for the use of the oceans
for radioactive waste disposal, therefore, is that the said use is a lawful
one under the doctrine of the freedom of the seas, perhaps with the
stipulation that the precautions and safeguards dictated by existing
scientific knowledge must be observed. In opposition it might be
contended that contamination of the oceans by depositing radioactive
elements therein violates the freedom of the seas by harming navigation
and fishing and is, therefore, an absolutely impermissible use regardless
of the safeguards adopted. Quite clearly, then, some test that balances
the respective claims must be utilized, and it has been pertinently
'Most theorists on the subject would undoubtedly consider the phrase "customary
international law" redundant. As one author points out, "traditionally international law is
customary law." D. O'CONNELL, I INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1965). It is used here to emphasize
the distinction between formal agreements and national or supranational legislation on the one
hand and rules of conduct which have evolved over a period of time to govern specific types of
situations and have gained recognition through repretition and general acceptance-that is,
"customary international law"-on the other. See id. at 3-36. Any further textual reference to
"international law" is intended to denote "customary international law" unless otherwise specified.
'McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security,
64 YALE L.J. 648, 657 (1955) [hereinafter cited as McDougal & Schlci]. The question of nuclear
testing was been at least partially settled by the 1963 Test Ban Treaty; therefore, the problem of
radioactive debris in the oceans as a result of nuclear testing is not considered herein.
7Christy, Marine Resources and the Freedom of the Seas, 8 NAT. REs. J. 424 (1968).
8Borgese, Towards an International Ocean Regime, 5 TEx. INT. L. FORUM 218, 222 (1970).
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observed that "the most relevant standard prescribed by customary
international law is that of reasonableness." 9
In applying the test of reasonableness to the question of ocean
disposal of radioactive waste, several factors would likely be considered:
Weight would be accorded any scientific evidence as to the effect
radioactive substances have on sea and human life, both directly and
indirectly through contamination of food sources. The increase in
production of nuclear wastes which would accompany any upsurge in
the use of nuclear power must be considered as well as the lack of
certitude concerning physical, chemical, and biological processes within
the sea required in order to determine how much, if any, fission product
can safely be introduced into the sea. Account must be taken of the
fact that once wastes are deposited in the oceans, they are largely beyond
human control, and whatever harmful effects might subsequently ensue
cannot be prevented. Finally, due to the complex and subtle
interdependencies within the ocean, it is possible that radioactive
contamination might spread far beyond the area immediately affected;
if so, then whatever one nation does in the oceans with respect to
radioactive waste-including depositing such wastes in its own
territorial waters-is of direct concern to all other nations.' 0
To be ballanced against the foregoing dangers are the considerable
benefits derived from the many uses of nuclear energy which produce
waste products requiring disposal. Furthermore, it mighf be argued that
natural declay is common to all radioactive materials; that is, all
radioisotopes ultimately reach a stage at which they are practically
harmless. This decay process is measured in terms of half-lives.,
Confining the dumping of radioactive waste products to those isotopes
with very limited half-lives arguably could significantly alter the danger
of pollution. It might also be contended that the fact that certain
radioactive materials have quite long half-lives may not be of overriding
importance if their concentration in the waste materials is low or if the
waste materials are intorudced into an environment which would afford
sufficient dilution.' 2
1M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 772 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as McDOUGAL & BURKE].
t1ld. at 852-53.
"A half-life refers to the period of time required for the radiation emissions to be reduced
by a factor of fifty percent; the half-lives of different radioisoptopes vary from a fraction of a
second to thousands of years. L. HYDEMAN & W. BERMAN, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR
MARITIME ACTIVITIES 59-60 (1960) [hereinafter cited as HYDEMAN & BERMAN].
111d. at 60.
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The contention that radioactive waste dumping is completely
unacceptable, therefore, would seem to rest on the assertion that no
conceiveable benefit from nuclear energy would justify the risk involved
in ocean disposal, no matter how this risk might be reduced through
the use of lead containers and short half-life materials, and no matter
how costly the alternatives to ocean disposal might be. Such an
argument probably would not prevail under the test of reasonbleness
ordinarily applied in international law. The past practice of nations,
particularly the major nuclear powers, generally confirms such a
deduction.
13
The conclusion that dumping radioactive wastes at sea does not
violate international law is reinforced by the fact that there appear to
have been almost no objections to specific disposal practices. Apart from
the general position of the Soviet Union, 4 there apparently has been
only one instance of international protest with regard to the dumping
of radioactive wastes.'s
In addition to the almost total lack of protest, it has also been noted
that "[n]o international tribunal has ever held a nation-state liable in
13Although the position of the United States seems to be changing or at least is being held
in abeyance, see text accompanying note 4 supra and note 47 infra, France (as evidenced by repeated
testing of nuclear devices) and Japan continue to pollute the oceans with radioactive wastes.
HYDEMAN & BERMAN 72. Pursuant to legislation, the United Kingdom since 1952 has been
employing a pipe-line to dispose of large quantities of low-level waste into the Irish Sea from the
Atomic Energy Authority's Windscale Works. Id. at 67.
"The Soviet Union-a nation, it'might be noted, with a very large land mass relative to
population-insists that all sea disposal, even of low-level radioactive materials, is impermissible.
Despite this position, however, Russia reportedly joined with other countries in a survey of an
area in the North Atlantic Ocean for the purpose of finding a suitable dumping-ground.
McDOUGAL & BURKE 861 n.49:
1In 1959 the government of Mexico objected through diplomatic channels to the proposed
issuance of a license by the United State4 Atomic Energy Commission to a private disposal firm
which wished to utilize a projectdd site in the Gulf of Mexico. The Mexican government was
represented at, and participated in, the hearing before the hearing examiner. In re Industrial Waste
Disposal Corp., AEC Docket No. 27-9 (1959) (intermediate decision of the hearing examiner),
reported in 4 Hearings on Industrial Radioactive Waste Disposal before the Special Subcomm.
on Radiation of the Ji. Comm. on Atomic Energy, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 3046 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as 1959 Hearings]. Apparently as a. result of the Mexican position and domestic objections,
the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission recommended that the license be
denied, despite the judgment of the Atomic Energy Commission's scientists that the proposed
disposal was safe and the fact that only limited amounts of low-level radioactive materials were
to be dumped. HYDEMAN & BERMAN 305. See also McDOUGAL & BURKE 861. While the decision
in this instance presumably was made with a view toward prevention of tension between neighboring
countries, it nevertheless reflects some uncertainty about international law concerning the dumping
of radioactive waste in the ocean and also the particular sensitivity of the nuclear issue.
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damages for pollution of the sea, or declared the existence of a duty
to desist."'" Absent a specific international agreement, moreover, it
remains unclear whether any nation would have standing to enforce an
unwritten obligation not to pollute. However, in The Trail Smelter
Arbitration7 the United Nations Arbitral Commission did award
damages to the state of Washington, on the claim of the United States,
for injury to coastal waters resulting from pollution caused by noxious
fumes emanating from a Canadian smelting plant. While this case might
be applicable to a situation where a nation's coastal or territorial waters
were damaged by pollution caused by dumping of radioactive wastes
in the ocean,'8 it clearly is not precedent for an action for damages
occurring on the high seas.' 9 In the absence of international conventions
dealing with the subject matter, therefore, an international decision-
"McDougal & Schlei 690.
"The Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), Award of April 16, 1939, and
March II, 1941, 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905. The tribunal held that "under the principles of international
law . . .. no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to
cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when
the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence."
Id. at 1965.
"Even this determination would require an extension of the Smelter decision, which specifically
applies to a nation's use of its own territory so as to cause damage to the territory of another.
Id. It is interesting, however, to consider one decision of the United States Supreme Court cited
by the Smelter tribunal, Id. at '1964. In New Jersey v. City of New York,.283 U.S. 473 (1931),
an original suit in the Supreme Court, the plaintiff state sought an injuntion against a public
nuisance. The defendant city contended that the nuisance was not actionable since the waste
involved was being dumped into the ocean and not within the waters of the United States, although
pollution of New Jersey's beaches and waters subsequently ensued. The Supreme Court granted
the injunction, holding that the situs of the acts creating the nuisance, whether within or without
the United States, was of no importance. Id. at 481. The decision was based on the fact that the
defendant was before the court and the property alleged to have been injured by such dumping
was within the court's territorial jurisdiction. This apparently constitutes some authority for one
nation gaining relief from pollution caused by another nation's dumping of wastes into the high
seas or even into its own territorial wasters. However, the Smelter rationale may limit relief to
those situations where the plaintiff is able to establish clearly injury or potential injury to its
territory. In addition, New Jersey involved an injunction, and thus could be distinguished from a
suit for damages. It must also be noted that the decision was one of a national tribunal rather
than an international one.
"See also.McDougal & Schlei 692. Initially it may be noted that the high seas are the territory
of no nation. In addition, it may be pointed out that the Smelter decision is "limited to'a factual
situation where actual damage had already occurred." HYDEMAN & BERMAN 280. No international
tribunal has ever considered a situation dealing with pollution as an abstract wrong, where no
actual injury has resulted from the pollution, but where a substantial risk of such damage exists.
Id. See also McDougal & Schlei 690. In New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921), New
York sought to enjoin New Jersey from employing a proposed system of sewage disposal. Although
the Supreme Court ultimately decided that the plaintiff "failed to show by. . .convincing evidence
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maker who might be "confronted with competing claims with respect
to pollution and freedom of navigation and fishing . . . [could] only
resort to such sources as 'general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations' [i.e., customary international law] and considerations
'ex aequo et bono [the test of reasonableness].' "20
It is evident, therefore, that little in the way of firm generalization
can be gleaned from these considerations. It is clear that several of the
leading nuclear powers believe that disposal of radioactive waste is a
safe procedure when the requisite inquiries and precuations are taken.
These nations have proceeded with disposal apparen'tly on the
assumption that under such circumstances it is a lawful use of the oceans
under the doctrine of freedom of the seas. On the other hand, the
uninhibited or unrestrained disposal of wastes as well as the placing of
high-level wastes in the ocean as a part of a waste disposal program
definitely are considered undesirable by the world-wide scientific
community. It may reasonably be predicted that in the future these
practices will be regarded as violative of international law. 2' The
carefully controlled dumping of radioactive wastes, on the other hand,
presumably is not presently regarded as being violative of international
law. This conclusion has prompted attempts by concerned governments
to evolve proscriptions against radioactive waste disposal in the oceans
on both regional and global levels. 22
Both the European Nuclear Energy Agency, which was established
by the Council of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation
in 1957, and the European Atomic Energy Community, which was
created in 1957, have been engaged in the study of problems of
radioactive waste disposal. Their efforts, however, have been directed
primarily at the avoidance of damage to the waters and territory of
.. . that the sewage . [would] create a public nuisance" or add to existing pollution, id. at
312-13, it did consider the merits of the complaint alleging potential injury. Once again, however,
the value of such precedent as an international adjudication is questionable. See HYDEMAN &
BERMAN 280.
"McDougal & Schlei 691, citing I.C.J. STAT. art. 38, I(c),2.
'.'For example, a special "committee of experts" working under the auspices of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, see text accompanying note 35 infra, came to the conclusion
that the dumping of highly radioactive wastes could not "be recommended as an operational
practice." INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, SAFETY SERIES No. 5, RADIOACTIVE WASTE
DISPOSAL INTO THE SEA 77 (1961) [hereinafter cited as IAEA, SAFETY SERIES No. 5].
22Hearings on Ocean Disposal of Unserviceable Chem. Munitions before the Subcomm. on
Oceanography of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong., ser. 91-31




neighboring countries. The question of the disposal at sea of nuclear
wastes seems to have been awaiting the results of attempts by
international agencies to develop world-wide regulations.?
Perhaps concern with this problem on an international level dates
from 1956 when the International Law Commission (ILC) 24 first
considered the question of nuclear waste.21 However, at that time the
discussion became entagled with the highly emotional problem of the
testing of nuclear weapons at sea, and it was only with difficulty that
the Commission was able to consider the disposal problem separately.
The "Convention on the High Seas,' 2 adopted from ILC drafts by
the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, reached no
decision on the permissibility of nuclear weapons testing but continued
an article apparently intended to be a statement of the principle that
freedom of the sea is not absolute.2 1 It provided that:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport
to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high
seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and
by the other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both
for coastal and noncoastal states:
1) Freedom of navigation;
2) Freedom of fishing;
3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general
principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with
reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of
the freedom of the high seas.2
" HYDEMAN & BERMAN 81.
2 The international Law Commission was established in 1947 by the General Assembly of
the United Nationsl pursuant to Article 13 of its Charter, which provides for the encouragement
of "the progressive development of international law and its codification." U.N. CHARTER art.
13, I(a).
2rThe International Commission on Radiological Protection, a private group established in
1928, has consistently dealt with standards of permissible dosages and working procedures for
the safe use of nuclear materials but has not advanced any specific proposals regarding radioactive
waste disposal in the oceans. McDOUGAL & BuRrK 864.
"UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, CONVENTION ON THE HIGH SEAS,
OFFICIAL RECORDS, Vol. II, Plenary Meetings, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF. 13/L. 53 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as CONVENTION]. The Conference met at Geneva from January 24 until April
27, 1958.
21See McDOUGAL & BURKE 773.
2'CONVENTION Art. 2.
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It seems, therefore, that the Convention extended the reasonableness test
to other "freedoms," which apparently would include nuclear testing
and the dumping of radioactive waste.
The Convention also dealt specifically with the problem of
radioactive waste disposal:
1. Every State shall take measures to prevent pollution of the
seas from the dumping of radioactive waste, taking into account any
standards and regulations which may be formulated by the competent
international organizations.
2. All states shall cooperate with the competent international
organizations in taking measures for the prevention of pollution of the
seas or air space above, resulting from any activities with radioactive
materials or other harmful agents.29
The commentators' opinion seems to be that these general declarations
were no more than admonishments to nations to cooperate in resolving
the specific problems and that no enforceable duty or obligation was
created .
30
In addition to the Convention, the Conference adopted a resolution
recommending that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IA EA)31
take whatever action is necessary to prevent pollution of the sea by
radioactive materials. 32 The IAEA, charged generally with seeking "to
accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health
and prosperity throughout the world," established a panel of experts
to study the problem of the disposal of radioactive wastes into the
2Id. Art. 25.
"°See Sorenson, Law of the Sea, 520 INT. CONCILIATION 195, 208 (1958).
"rhe IA EA was established at a 1956 United Nations conference in New York. The Agency's
Statute was drawn up and signed at the conference.
uThe resolution stated in part that
[t]he International Atomic Energy Agency, in consultation with existing goups and
established organs having acknowledged competence in the field of radiological
protection, should pursue whatever studies and take whatever action is necessary to assist
States in controlling the discharge or release of radioactive materials to the sea, in
promulgating standards, and in drawing up internationally acceptable regulations to
prevent pollution of the sea by radioactive material in amounts which would adversely
affect man and his marine resources.
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY TIlE
CONFERENCE, II, OFFICIAL RECORDS, Vol. 11, Plenary Meetings, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.
13/L. 56 (1958).




ocean.34 Included among the panel's goals is the preparation of
recommendations which might form the basis for an international
agreement concerning, among other things, the establishment of criteria
for evaluating proposed dumping sites, registration of disposals, and
monitoring disposed wastes.
35
In conjunction with its stated purpose, the panel published an
extensive report dealing with the discharge of radioactive wastes into
the hydrosphere.36 A major conclusion of the panel's study was that
although the production of radioactive waste is unavoidable, "the
release into the sea of highly-radioactive [material] . . . cannot be
recommended as an operational practice. ' 37 The panel also concluded,
however, that "wastes of low and intermediate activity may safely be
disposed of into the sea under controlled and specified conditions. '38
To increase the safety of such disposals, the IAEA made several
recommendations, including the maintenance by the IAEA of a registry
of disposal sites, utilization of current International Commission of
Radiological Protection 39 studies to evaluate the suitability of proposed
waste disposals, standardization of monitoring techniques, and
international collaboration to review continuously the problems
connected with radioactive waste disposal into the sea.40 Although most
of these suggestions have been adopted by the IAEA in its own code
of procedure, they nevertheless are bindingly imposed upon a country
only when it is the recipient of installations or fissionable materials from
the IAEA.
41
Two international conventions which bear on the problem of
radioactive waste disposal have been drafted under the auspices of the
3 4The panel, established in 1959, is composed of scientists from several nations and of observers
from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; the World H~ealth
Organization; and the Food and Agriculture Organization.
'ITestimony of D.W. Pritchard, 1959 Hearings 2882.
'The report, published in the IAEA's SAFETY SERIES, was issued in two parts, which dealt
respectively with the disposal of radioactive waste into the sea and into fresh water areas. See
IAEA, SAFETY SERIES No. 5, and IAEA, SAFETY SERIES No. 10, DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE
WASTE INTO FRESH WATER (1963). In this SAFETY SERIES the IAEA continues to present reports
on various aspects of nuclear waste control. See, e.g., IAEA, SAFETY SERIES No. 6, REGULATIONS
FOR THE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (1965), and SAFETY SERIES No. 16, MANUAL
ON ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING IN NORMAL OPERATION (1966).
37 AEA, SAFETY SERIES No. 5, at 77.
31ld.
"See note 25 supra.
40IAEA, SAFETY SERIES No. 5 at 77-79.
4D. BowErr, THE LAW OF THE SEA 47 (1967).
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IAEA.42 The first of these is the 1962 Brussels Convention on the
Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships.4 3 Essentially, the Brussels
Convention provides that the operator of a nuclear ship is "absolutely
liable for any nuclear damage upon proof that such damage has been
caused by a nuclear incident involving the nuclear fuel of, or radioactive
products or waste produced in, such ship.""
The second convention is the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage. 41 It imposes absolute liability upon the
operator of a nuclear installation for nuclear damage upon proof that
such damage was caused by a nuclear incident in the installation or
involved nuclear material coming from or originating in the
installation.46 While other articles made it clear that neither of these
conventions would be applicable to vessels transporting radioactive
wastes for disposal or to damage caused by radioactive pollution of the
sea, it is nonetheless significant that the concept of absolute liability
has been applied to the question of nuclear incidents. This formulation
clearly could be applied in an international agreement concerning
damage caused by the dumping of radioactive waste into the sea.
In response to growing pressure from environmentalists and
ecologists, and in the absence of formal international action, many
governments have taken individual initiatives. 47 For example, in the
United States the Council on Environmental Quality, noting that the
amount of oceanic dumping by private and public agencies has
quadrupled in the last twenty-one years, recommended legislation
completely banning the disposal of all toxic materials, including
radioactive wastes, into the sea.48 An interesting legal aspect is the
4The European Nuclear Energy Agency Brussels Convention on Third Party Liability in the
Field of Nuclear, opened for signature _ 1960, - U.N.T.S. _., is a third convention in
this area. It is directed towards a regional approach, however, and for this reason is not considered
herein.
"IAEA Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, opened for signature - 1963,
- U.N.T.S. -
"Id. at Art. 11 (1).
MIAEA Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, opened for signature - 1963,
- U.NT.S. -
"Id. at Art. II (l)(a) & (b).
"12 LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 281-332 (M. Marks ed., Progress in Nuclear Energy, Series
X, 1959) contains a review of the legislation and administrative procedures and practices regarding
atomic energy in some twenty different countries. HYDEMAN & BERMAN 71-77 briefly surveys the
controls imposed by several different nations on the disposal at the time of its publication. OCEAN
DUMPING 36 comments on recent activity in this area in Canada, Israel, and Argentina.
4Id. at vi-vii. In response to the possible objection that there may be no other method of
diposing of wastes, the Council on Environmental Quality categorically asserted that their
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Council's suggestion that the authority for controlling ocean pollution
be based not on the United States' sovereignty over coastal waters, but
on the federal government's power over American citizens leaving a port
with a commodity.49 In this case the commodity would be waste
products, and the effect apparently would be to empower Congress to
prohibit dumping by United States citizens on the high seas as well as
in coastal waters.
While the action recommended by regional and domestic agencies
such as the Council on Environmental Quality may assist in controlling
the pollution of the ocean from the dumping of radioactive and other
waste, it seems clear that an international solution is required for a
global problem. 5 International standards such as those promulgated by
the IAEA, whether comprised of total proscriptions or limitations based
on the reasonableness test, must be maintained. A system for
determining liability and imposing sanctions must be developed. Such
a system might be effected through a convention granting to a United
Nations agency, presumably the IAEA, the responsibility for issuing
licenses for any dumping activity considered permissible, and for the
monitoring and recording of disposals for which licenses had been
granted. The agency also should have the authority to impose penalties
for violation of its standards. Moreover, in the event that damage results
from occurrences in packaging the waste, transporting it, placing it in
the ocean, or from subsequent events connected with the deposit, strict
liability should be imposed either on the operator of the installation
which was the source of the waste or on the depositor. Furthermore,
the agency should have the authority either to settle disputes or to refer
them for international adjudication.
There naturally remains the problem of securing the assent of all
nations to a convention such as that described in the preceding
paragraph. It is to be hoped that in such a situation where the interests
of all nations are at stake, the concert of interest will provide the
necessary impetus for compliance. The compelled or voluntary
investigations indicated the existence of interim alternatives to ocean dumping and that future
technological advances and new methods of recycling should greatly decrease pressures for ocean
disposal. Id. at 29. The Council also suggests as a major conclusion of their study that "a program
of phasing out all forms of ocean dumping and prohibiting new sources is feasible without greatly
increased costs." Id.
1"1d. at 33.
wrhe 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment to be held in Stockholm
would provide an excellent opportunity to meet this urgent need.
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cooperation of all will be essential if the pollution caused by the dumping
of wastes in the ocean is to be dealt with effectively and comprehensively.
JOSEPH R. JOHN
International Law-Oil Spills and Their Legal Ramifications
Historically, man has demonstrated an unfortunate tendency to
become the victim of his own technological achievements. Nowhere has
this inability to cope with progress been more apparent thai in the
exploitation and shipment of oil. Although oil is the lifeblood of our
industrialized society, it has the potential to devastate both the ecology
and the economy. This realization has recently exploded in the context of
increasing domestic and international concern in the wake of the Torrey
Canyon incident and the blowout in the Santa Barbara Channel.
Although the issues have been brought into sharp focus by these events,
practical solutions are not yet available. At best, these tragedies have
only served to point out the painful inadequacy of existing legislative and
conventional authority in the area of oil spills and their legal
ramifications.
THE EXTENT OF THE THREAT
The events surrounding the sinking of the Torrey Canyon in March,
1967, supplied much of the impetus for the present level of public
concern. The problem of oil pollution, however, is neither new nor
limited to such spectacular events. Reports date back to 1754, when the
Russians added another "first" to their long series of exploits by
becoming the first to pollute the sea with oil.' In that case a portion of
the Caspian Sea off Baku was defiled by the leakage of a quantity of
bulk oil cargo in wooden bottoms. Even before industry's conversion
from steam to oil-the point at which many commentators believe oil
pollution became a major concern 2 -domestic legislation seeking to
counteract the threat was already in existence.3 Nevertheless, it took two
'Stubbs, Oil Pollution: Penalty and Damage Aspects, 16 U.S.N. JAG J. 140 (1962).
"Nanda, The "Torrey Canyon" Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 DENVER L.J. 400,406 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Nanda].
3E.g., Act of Aug. 5, 1886, ch. 929, § 3, 24 Stat. 329. Even though the Act did not specifically
prohibit the dumping of oil in New York habor, subsequent laws with similar wording have been
construed to prohibit such discharges. See The S.S. Nea Hellis, 116 F.2d 803, 806 (2d Cir. 1941).
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world wars and half a century of technological progress to bring the
problem into its true perspective.
Today, tankers carry over 700 million tons of petroleum and
petroleum products annually.4 Their number, though representing forty
percent of the world ocean traffic,5 is far less significant than their
individual capacities. While the standard tankers of two decades ago
averaged 16,000 deadweight tons,6 their modern progeny commonly
exceed 100,000 tons. 7 With the recent launching of the 312,000 ton
Universe Ireland, even tankers of this latter class may be destined for
obsolescence. 8
It was almost inevitable that a tragedy reflecting these technological
advances would eventually occur. That fear became reality on March 18,
1967, when the 118,000 ton Torrey Canyon ran aground on the Seven
Stones reef off the coast of Cornwall, England. Driven by strong winds
and high seas, the oil dispersed across the channel, killed thousands of
seabirds and millions of fish, and contaminated oyster beds, fisheries,
and one hundred forty miles of the Cornish coast?
Although claims growing out of the disaster may run as high as two
billion dollars,1" the true cost cannot be measured monetarily. In terms
of detrimental effects on the environment, and particularly on the chain
of marine life, the extent of the damage, if known, would stagger the
imagination.
Surprisingly, such tragedies, however dramatic, are not the primary
'Edwards, Oil Pollution and the Law, in OIL POLLUTION: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 21, 23 (S.
Degler ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Edwards].
Nanda 01-02.
'Ludwigson, Oil Pollution at Sea, in OIL POLLUTION: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 1 (S. Degler ed.
1969) [hereinafter cited as Ludwigson].
'Id. Most of the progress in this area is directly attributable to the American petroleum
industry, which, in attempting to meet the demands of the post-war recovery in Western Europe and
Japan, discovered the economies of scale. In terms of capital outlay and operating and
administrative costs, today's "supertankers" are far more economical than their smaller ancestors.
E. COWAN, OIL AND WATER: THE TORREY CANYON DISASTER 11-14 (1968).
8See Ludwigson 8.
'Nanda 400. Restorative efforts were largely ineffectual. Attempts to set the oil afire with
napalm, powdered magnesium and other incendiary weapons met with little success, as the rising
steam quickly snuffed out the flames. Similarly, floating booms and other methods of physical
collection proved difficult due to the localized heavy seas. Once the oil reached shore, the British
made generous use of detergents, but this too had to be discontinued because of the effect on the
marine life. Ludwigson 3-4.
"Ludwigson 4. Excluding private claims, suits by the British and French governments totaled
sixteen million dollars. Id.
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cause of oil pollution." Instead, the bulk of such discharges are
preventable. Bilge pumping, ballast dumping and carelessness in
shoreside fueling operations account for a large part of the estimated 100
million tons of oil spilled into the sea annually. 12
The oil spill in the Santa Barbara Channel illustrates that man's
impatience to secure the benefits of his discoveries without first
investigating the possible hazards is not limited to the shipment of oil
alone. In that instance, the federal sale of petroleum leases had brought
the largest total amount, 13 the largest amount for a single tract, 4 and the
highest per acre bid'5 ever for an offshore lease-sale. Despite pleas by
local residents and conservationists to extend a two mile buffer zone
established earlier by the Department of the Interior, the Secretary
refused to widen the area, arguing that the zone had already cost the
government 100 million dollars in bonuses and an additional 500 million
dollars ip future royalties. 6 On January 28, 1969, the first successful well
on Tract 402 suffered a severe blowout during the withdrawal of a worn
drill bit. Although the well was quickly capped, the increased pressure
forced large quantities of oil through fissures in the sea's floor, and
within a few days oil covered a large portion of the two hundred square
mile channel. 7 A second seepage expanded this area to include four
hundred square miles of the Pacific Ocean and forty miles of white sand
beaches. 8 It was not until the damage was evident that the Secretary of
the Interior heeded the earlier warnings and admitted the lack of
knowledge concerning local geological conditions. 9 Meanwhile, suits
"Edwards 23.
"Nanda 402-03. In considering the extent of the threat, one should not ignore the 150 ships
lying on the floor of the Atlantic off the U.S. coast. Like ghosts returning to haunt the living, the
five million barrels of oil contained within them have been blamed for recent pollutions of Virginia,
New Jersey, and Cape Cod beaches. Id. at 403.
"Note, Continental Shelf Oil Disasters: Challenge to International Pollution Control, 55
CORNELL L. REV. 113 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Oil Disasters]. The high bids which were accepted
by the federal government as an aggregate sales price totaled 603,204,284 dollars. Channel Sale
Swamps Offshore Records, 66 OIL AND GAS J., Feb. 12, 1968, at 66.
"Oil Disasters 113. A four-company group of bidders, headed by Union Oil Company,
captured single-lease honors at a cost of 61,418,000 dollars. Channel Sale Swamps Offshore
Records, supra note 13.
"Oil Disasters 113.
"Added Santa Barbara Sale Curbs Rapped, 65 OIL AND GAS J., Dec. 4, 1967, at 40.
"N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1969, at 19, col. I.
"SeeTim, Feb. 14, 1969, at23.
"167 OIL AND GAS J., Feb. 17, 1969, at 43.
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exceeding one billion dollars had been filed against both the United
States and Union Oil Company.
20
It would be encouraging to believe that lessons have been learned
from the Torrey Canyon and Santa Barbara incidents. Yet, reliable
evidence to the contrary exists. Offshore drilling continues at even
greater depths, and increasing numbers of supertankers-heavily laden
with oil-continue to ply the seas. All of the indicatQrs point to the fact
that the problem of oil pollution is here to stay, and since progress
cannot be impeded, the only means of effective regulation must lie in the
law.
EXISTING REGULATORY MEASURES
The United States is signatory to a number of international
conventions concerning oil pollution. However, none of these agreements
provide the control necessary for effective protection. Foremost among
the multilateral instruments is the 1954 Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil.2' The agreement:
Defines prohibited zones. . . in which discharges of oil are regulated.
Requires logging of oil discharges and losses.
Obliges signatory governments to promote the installation of oil-
receiving facilities in their ports.
Sets procedures for apprehension and prosecution of vessels which
violate the provisions of the Convention.22
Though all nations probably share a common interest in the treaty's
objectives, conflicting domestic policies frequently discourage the
adoption of its provisions. In such situations, the economic advantages
gained by attracting ships to a nation's registry may induce the nation to
provide less stringent regulatory measures than those prescribed by the
1954 Convention.23 Similarly, the abstract nature of long-range interests
often yields to immediate economic expediency, and thus leads to
nonobservance by individual ships. 24 The frequency of such deliberate oil
discharges had been noted above,23 and it is virtually impossible to
"See N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1969, at I, col. 3.




"See note 12 & accompanying text supra.
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identify the specific offender. Finally, the 1954 Convention suffers the
weakness common to all treaties in that it is applicable only to ships
registered by the signatory parties.
The 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
produced three instruments which may lay the groundwork for more
effective control in the future. The first of these agreements is the Geneva
Convention on the High Seas. 26 In obliging each nation to promulgate
regulations to prevent pollution "by the discharge of oil from ships or
pipelines or resulting from the exploitation and exploration of the seabed
and its subsoil," 2 7 it provides some implementation for the 1954
Convention.
The second agreement which grew out of the Conference is the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. 2 As applied to
the United States, this instrument permits the federal government to
exercise controls necessary to prevent violations of its sanitary
regulati6ns within its territory or territorial sea to a point extending
twelve miles from the baseline from which the territorial sea is
measured.2 1 In the event this treaty is self-executing, 3 it would sanction
enforcement of the Oil Pollution Act of 1924 3 anywhere within a twelve
mile zone adjacent to the coast of the United States.
In an attempt to cope with the problems of offshore drilling, the
Conference also drafted the Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf.32 While endeavoring to lend some international recognition to the
occupation of the shelf, it is' rapidly becoming inadequate in its
definitional provisions. This fact is amply illustrated by its
"exploitability" test in determining what constitutes the continental
shelf.3 Today, offshore drilling in depths up to five thousand feet is
"April 29, 1958, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2313, T.I.A.S. No. 5200.
111d. at 2319.
"April 29, 1958, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1607, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,
2Id. at 1612.
"There appears to be some question on this point, and in an effort to resolve any doubts, the
President-has recommended specific implementing legislation for the Convention. Edwards 25.
"'Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 316,43 Stat. 604, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 431-37 (1964). "Under
amendments contained in the Clean Waters Restoration Act of 1966, the term
'discharge'-originally intended to cover any escape of oil-is defined as 'grossly negligent, or
willful spilling of oil.' Because of its wording, the 1924 Act is extremely difficult to enforce." Oil
Disasters 121.
uApril 29, 1958, [1964] I U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578.
"For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf" is used as refering (a) to
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of
l000 [Vol. 49
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becoming feasible. In the future, as all parts of the ocean floor become
"exploitable," permanent platforms in the North Sea may not only
threaten the quality of the water but may also jeopardize navigation in
general .
3
POSSIBLE AVENUES FOR IMPROVEMENT
Presently, one of the major obstacles to the effective control of oil
pollution lies in the lingering concept of the supremacy of the law of the
flag on the high seas. The widespread use of flags of convenience
accentuates this problem by frequently leaving the real victim of a
pollution disaster at the mercy of a nation whose interests are motivated
more by economics than ecology.35 In such situations, it has been
suggested that the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction should yield to a
principle conferring concurrent jurisdiction upon both the nation of the
flag and the injured nation.3 Besides affording a sympathetic tribunal to
the coastal nation, such an approach would avoid the serious political
consequences which might flow from extreme measures of self-help in
the event of a pollution crisis.
37
With such a jurisdictional concept serving as a foundation, the
the territorial sea, to a depth of two hundred metres or, beyond that limit, to where the




"-See Nanda 404-05. The International Court of Justice pointed out in an advisory opinion that
despite the foreign ownership of many vessels registered in Liberia and Panama, these two countries
are among the eight "largest ship-owning nations." Advisory opinion on Constitution of the
Maritime Safety Committee of the IMCO, [1960] I.C.J. 150.
'-Oil Disasters 126. Though such an approach might be suggested by the S.S. "Lotus," [1927]
P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, it has since been dispelled by Article 6 (1) of the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the High Seas which provides:
Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly
provided for in international treaties or in these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive
jurisdiction on the high seas.
Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 6, para. 1, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, 2315, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200.
3r'The political consequences potentially arising from the jurisdictional complexities of the
Torrey Canyon are staggering. The ship was American-owned, Liberian-registered, manned by an
Italian crew, and on a single-voyage charter to the British Petroleum Company. It went aground in
international waters and, after being abandoned by the owners, was destroyed through the
combined efforts of British naval and air forces. Finally, it was contracted for salvage to a Dutch
company. See generally COWAN, supra note 7 and Nanda 401. The situation has been aptly termed
"a law professor's examination question dream." Oil Disasters 117 n.29.
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existing law could be used as a basis for more effective agreements in the
areas of prevention, compensation, and enforcement. Within this first
class might fall comprehensive treaties modeled after the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone or instruments which extend
the prohibited zones under the 1954 Convention.
A multilateral convention assigning sealanes between various
international ports of call would also be worthy of consideration."
Similarly, treaties requiring the installation of more sophisticated
navigational aids or establishing rigid standards for ship construction
might further serve to reduce the hazards of collisions at sea. 9
The problem of compensation can be divided into two distinct
subclasses-remuneration and restoration. Efforts to afford the injured
nation just compensation in the former area could take the form of
treaties prescribing strict liability for oil spills, except when necessary to
save human life.4" In order td assure that adequate funds are available, it
has beeh suggested that nations require spillage insurance as a
prerequisite to registration under their flags.4 Alternatively, the
establishment of an international fund to which shipbuilders or
shipowners would contribute in a method akin to an international tax
might also be feasible.4" The problem of restoration could best be
handled by a multilateral instrument founded on one
principle-cooperation. By assuring the availability of the latest
discoveries in absorbents and chemical dispersants, no state would fear
the futility that Great Britain experienced following the Torrey Canyon
disaster.4 3
Regardless of the methods by which the problems of prevention and
compensation are approached, they will prove ineffectual unless some
competent agency is bestowed with enforcement authority. The most
obvious body to accept this responsibility would be the
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultive Organization (IMCO), under
whose auspices the 1954 Convention was prepared. At present, however,
this specialized agency of the United Nations has no such authority, and
its miniscule budget prevents it from exerting more than a minimal
influence on such a weighty problem.44





4'Se note I0 supra.
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The possible solutions outlined above are neither exhaustive nor
totally adequate in themselves. Yet, they do provide a step in the right
direction. In order to meet the complexities of this changing world, man
must not be content to indict technology itself, for in so doing he is but
indirectly blaming his own inability or unwillingness to secure
cooperation in the international community. If he is not to fall victim to
his environment, he must be willing to act and to compromise within a
legal framework.
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